Introduction To Scholastic Ontology.pdf

Introduction to Scholastic Ontology

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/introsch.htm

Introduction to Scholastic Ontology

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/introsch.htm

various types of constituents posited by mainline Aristotelian scholastic

metaphysicians.

Introduction to Scholastic Ontology

II. Modes of Composition in Scholastic Ontology

A. Physical composition

I. Constituent Ontology

The requirement of physical composition arises from the analysis of change.

Aristotle posited three principles of change, viz., privation, form, and matter. The

matter of a given change is that which perdures through the change and is

modified by the change, whereas the form is the terminus ad quem of the change

and the privation the terminus a quo of the change.

A constituent ontology, as I am conceiving of it, aims at a general characterization

of substances in terms of various types of constituents which are in some

straightforward sense intrinsic to them and compatible with their status as unified

wholes. Scholastic ontology is in this broad sense a constituent ontology.

Now every plausible ontology of material substances must acknowledge that such

substances have material constituents or parts and can thus be characterized as

composite in that sense. However, scholastic ontology sees the natures (or

essences) of such substances, as well as their characteristics (or accidents), as

individuals intrinsic to those substances and capable of existing only within

singular substances. The natures of such substances constitute them as entities of a

given natural kind, whereas their accidents (both those that emanate directly from

the natures and those that are peculiar to particular substances within a given

natural kind) are related to them by the 'transcendental' relation of inherence .

In cases of qualified or accidental change, this analysis requires that there be a

composition of substance and accident, where the substance is the matter of the

change and the accident which comes to modify the substance is the form. This

accident or accidental form is a reality (perfection, sort of being) that depends for

its existence on the existence of the substance in which it inheres. Such accidents

are usually taken to fall into categories along the lines suggested by Aristotle,

though among the later medievals there were heated debates about the status of

accidents. Ockham, for instance, saw Aristotle's categories as a classification of

terms rather than of entities and went on to argue that only certain terms in the

category of quality signify distinctive entities; Suarez and St. Thomas, grants a

type of reality to all accidents, though Suarez assigns some the status of modes,

which, unlike full-fledged accidents, are only "modally distinct" and not "really

distinct" from the substances in which they inhere. (A real distinction implies

separability at least by God's absolute power.) Modes are something like states of

substances and have less unity and independence than do, say, qualities. In any

case, the three basic types of accidental change are (i) alteration (change with

respect to quality), (ii) augmentation and diminution (change with respect to

quantity), and local motion (change with respect to place). All changes with

respect to other categories are reducible, i.e., able to be traced back, to these three.

A non-constituent ontology, by contrast, aims at a general characterization of

substances in terms of their relations to entities (e.g., Platonistically conceived

universals or properties, including abstract essences and natures) that have their

being and reality independently of those substances. These natures and

characteristics of substances are in some obvious way extrinsic to them and linked

to them by the relation of exemplification or participation . On such a view all

individuals are in some sense lacking in intrinsic composition at any level other

than that of integral parts. At the very least, this sort of ontology does not think of

other sorts of composition as ontologically significant.

The recent literature on divine simplicity in analytic philosophy of religion

illustrates well how skewed matters become when those who work within a

non-constituent ontology try to address without adequate care or preparation

relevant aspects of scholastic metaphysics. For the scholastics were able to fashion

a substantive and metaphysically interesting account of the distinction between

God and creatures by characterizing God as wholly simple, i.e., wholly lacking in

the sorts of composition characteristic of creaturely substances. Thus, they

claimed, for instance, that in God there is no composition of form and matter, of

substance and accident, of esse and essentia , or of genus and difference. However,

each of these claims, if transformed without due care into the framework of

non-constituent ontology, leads to patent absurdities. (For an analysis of this

situation I recommend Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Divine Simplicity," Philosophical

Perspectives 5 (1991): 531-552.)

But Aristotle insisted, apparently in keeping with common sense but contrary to

received philosophical wisdom, that at least some really real things ( ousiai ) could

themselves come into and pass out of existence through change. If such

unqualified or substantial change is possible, there must be within the relevant

substances (or individual natures) a composition of (primary) matter and

(substantial) form. So the same matter can successively be a constituent of

different substances and even of different kinds of substances. The types of

substantial change are generation and corruption. (A note on Empedocles,

Anaxagoras, and the atomists).

The form/matter and substance/accident distinctions can both be seen as

determinations of the more general distinction between act and potency , since in

each case what we have is a determinable "matter" (a potentiality) being

determined or actualized or brought to completion by a determinant "form" (an

actuality), which is the terminus of the change.

In what follows I will try to explain the motivations for the postulation of the

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Introduction to Scholastic Ontology

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/introsch.htm

Introduction to Scholastic Ontology

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/introsch.htm

Aquinas's distinction between being ( esse ) and essence is yet another instance of

this general distinction between act and potency, one that is meant to

accommodate, contrary to received philosophical wisdom, the possibility of an

exercise of efficient causality that is not a modification of an existing matter or

substratum but is instead a creation ex nihilo of a substance with all its accidents

( essentia ). In this case the notion of a principle of potentiality is stretched a bit,

since this principle does not exist prior to the exercise of efficient causality.

Nonetheless, Aquinas and his followers insist that the distinction between esse and

essence is a real distinction (in his sense of 'real distinction', which does not

involve separability) on a par with the distinctions between substance and accident

and between form and matter. (Suarez takes this distinction to be a conceptual

distinction with a foundation in reality, but this difference is not of present concern

to us.)

term has a composite definition that signals similarities among natural kinds

as well as differences. For instance, both angels and aardvarks are

substances, but the former are immaterial whereas the latter are material.

The question then is: Is there a distinctive metaphysical constituent of a

substance corresponding to each element in its definition? To take the

simple hackneyed example, is there within a human being a distinctive

'metaphysical' constituent corresponding to each of the following

natural-kind terms: 'substance', 'body' ('material substance'), 'living

substance', 'sentient substance' ('animal'), 'rational', and, finally, 'human

being' itself?

Duns Scotus, for one, argued that there must be distinctive constituents of

this sort (he called them 'formalities') if scientific methodology and theories

are to be well-grounded. This is why he thought of them as 'metaphysical'

constituents and then was faced with the problem of relating these

metaphysical constituents to the corresponding physical constituents

(matter/form) of the same substance. Also, Scotus thought that among the

metaphysical constituents or formalities of a given substance there must be

an individuator or individual difference that accounts for that substance's

metaphysical distinctness from the other members of the same lowest-level

species.

Thus we have the following:

Type of Causality

Act

(Passive)

Potency

creation/annihilation

esse

essentia

Most other scholastics, by contrast, deny that substances have distinctive

metaphysical constituents in addition to their physical constituents.

According to them, the problem is to show how the various logical or

conceptual constituents of natural kind concepts and their definitions are

related to the physical constituents of the relevant substances. How, for

instance, are distinctions like matter/form and substance/accident related to

concepts of genus, species, and difference? And in the background is the

question that held Aristotle's attention in the impenetrable middle books of

the Metaphysics , viz., how can entities that exhibit these various modes of

composition have the unity characteristic of primary substances?

unqualified change:

generation & corruption

(substantial)

form

(primary)

matter

qualified change:

alteration & augmentation/diminution

& local motion

accident

substance

B. Logical (alternatively: metaphysical) composition

The postulation of modes of physical composition arises from the analysis

of change; there is another sort of composition, the postulation of which

arises from broadly scientific considerations. If we think of scientific

theorizing as beginning with a taxonomy of natural kinds arranged

according to species and genus (reminiscent of Aristotle's category of

substance ), and if we think of the goal of scientific inquiry as objective

knowledge of the natures of physical substances, then we will naturally ask

about the metaphysical grounds for our use of natural kinds terms, their

definitions, and predications in which such terms appear as the subject and

various (discovered) properties that 'emanate from' the relevant natures or

essences appear as predicates, e.g., 'Salt is soluble in water'. Such statements

(or 'laws') are in some obvious sense about universals or common natures

rather than primarily about singulars; or at least this much is true: If George

is a chunk of salt, then George is soluble by virtue of its being constituted as

a member of the natural kind salt .

With this background we are ready to look at the first two sections of

Disputation 5, in which Suarez characterizes singular or individual unity and

then asks what this sort of unity adds to the common nature in such a way as

to compose with that common nature a singular substance.

Alfred J. Freddoso

University of Notre Dame

Now all the scholastics agree that each secondary-substance or natural kind

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Disp. 5, sect. 1

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0501.htm

Disp.5,sect.1

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0501.htm

Disputation 5, Section 1:

i.e., divisible into many entitates which are such as it itself is." Note

that even per accidens unities (e.g., a heap of stones), numbers greater

than one, and common natures (i.e., genera and species) themselves

have a sort of individuality. But they do not have full-fledged singular

unity because they are not per se entities, i.e., entities that as such

have natures capable of existing `in an unmediated way'. "So the

notion of per se individual and singular unity consists in entitas that is

by its nature one per se and is undivided or incommunicable in the

aforementioned sense."

Are all things that exist or are able to exist singular and

individual?

I. Reasons for doubting an affirmative answer (n. 1)

A. The case of God : The divine nature is communicable to the three

divine persons, in the same way that the common nature human being ,

which is not a singular entity, is communicable to many individuals.

III. the resolution of the question (nn. 4-5)

B. The case of angels : Angels have only specific or essential unity and

not numerical or singular unity. So each angel is akin to what the

common nature human being would be if it existed on its own as

such.

A. The answer : "Given that the notion of an individual or singular

being has been explicated in the above way, one should claim that all

things which are actual beings, i.e., which exist or are able to exist in

an unmediated way, are singular and individual. I say `in an

unmediated way' in order to exclude the common natures of things,

which cannot as such exist in an unmediated way or have actual

entitas except within singular and individual entities--the latter being

such that if they are destroyed, then it is impossible for anything real

to remain."

C. The case of common natures as existing in individuals : The

common nature human being exists in Peter and Paul and is not as

such a singular thing.

II. An analysis of the notion of individual (or singular or numerical)

unity (nn. 2-3)

Question: Given this, what distinguishes common natures from

accidents?

B. Argument :

A. Analysis : That which is singular or individual is opposed to that

which is common or universal (i.e., that which has specific or generic

unity rather than numerical unity) in the sense that that which is

singular or individual "is one in such a way that, under that notion of

being by which it is called one, it is not communicable to many as to

things which are [logically] inferior to or subordinated to it, or to

things which are many within that same notion." For instance, the

common nature human being lacks singular unity because it is

communicable to and common to many humanities (Peter, Paul, Joan,

etc.) which share the same notion, viz., human being . By contrast,

Peter, i.e., this humanity, is not common to many individuals which

share the notion this humanity . Also, Peter and Paul are subordinated

to human being in the sense of falling under it as determinates under a

determinable. So what is distinctive about numerical or individual

unity is the negation of a certain sort of divisibility, viz., divisibility of

a determinable into lower-level determinates.

(1) Whatever exists has a fixed and determinate entitas .

(2) But every such entitas has an added negation.

Therefore, every such entitas has singularity and individual

unity.

Proof of (2): Every entitas , by the very fact that it is a

determinate entitas , is unable to be divided from itself;

therefore, every entitas is also such that it cannot be

divided into many entitates which are such as it is (since

otherwise the whole entitas would be in each of them and

so it would, insofar as it exists in one of them, be divided

from itself insofar as it exists in another--which is

manifestly absurd).

According to Suarez, this argument shows that universals

cannot exist in reality separate from singular things. The

argument depends crucially on the rhetorical question:

How can a universal be truly predicated of, or essentially

constitute, a singular thing unless it exists in that thing?

That is, how can the essence or nature of a given thing be

B. Amplification : "Singular entitas is such that it is not the case that

its whole notion ( ratio ) is communicable to many similar entitates ,

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Disp. 5, sect. 1

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0501.htm

Disp.5,sect.1

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0501.htm

something separate from it that does not exist within it?

This is precisely the question that many modern-day

Platonists answer with a resounding: "Easy! That's just

the way it is."

C. The plurality question: What makes numerical plurality within a

given species possible? That is, what is the metaphysical ground for

the possibility that there should exist more than one individual of a

given species? (This question is obviously different from the

individuality question, since it is conceivable that an individual should

belong to a species that cannot be multiplied into many individuals;

this, of course, is just what St. Thomas himself believes to be true of

the angelic species. The plurality question also differs from the

distinctness question, even though they are intimately related; for the

distinctness question has a place only on the assumption that there is a

plurality of individuals within a given species.)

IV. Reply to original reasons for doubting an affirmative answer (nn.

6-8)

To A : The divine nature is singular and is communicable to the

persons not as a superior to an inferior (or species to an individual),

but in the manner of a form to a suppositum. The nature is not divided

from itself, but instead is whole in each of them. Note, then, that the

relation of the divine nature to the three divine persons is not to be

thought of as like the relation of the common nature human being to

Peter, Joan, and Paul. It's rather as if the same singular humanity were

each of Peter, Joan, and Paul. This is why the Trinity is mysterious.

To B : Some Thomists think that spiritual natures are like abstract

specific essences, but this will be discussed later. In the meantime, we

simply deny that angelic natures are anything other than singulars, and

this independently of how one answers the question of whether an

angelic nature can be multiplied in many individuals within the same

species.

To C : Human being , as it exists in reality, is singular, since it is

nothing other than Peter, Paul, etc. But whether it is in any sense

distinct from the individuals will be discussed in the next chapter.

V. Three separate questions concerning individuation

A. The individuality question: What is the intrinsic principle by virtue

of which a thing of a given species, say the species aardvark , is this

aardvark or numerically one aardvark or an individual aardvark? That

is, what constitutes it as something which is, as the Latin term

individuum suggests, indivisible into things each of which shares the

very same notion?

B. The distinctness question: Given a pair of individuals of the same

species, what is the intrinsic principle by virtue of which this one is

distinct from that one? (Note that distinctness is different from

individuality or numerical unity, since distinctness, unlike

individuality, is a relation that presupposes the existence of at least

two individuals.)

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Disp. 5, sect. 2

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0502.htm

Disp.5,sect.2

http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/618/dm0502.htm

Disputation 5, Section 2:

A. Affirmative : "The first position affirms in general that at least in the

case of created things the individual adds to the common nature some

real mode which (i) is in reality distinct from the nature itself and

which (ii) composes, along with that nature, the individual itself."

Is it the case that in all natures the individual and singular thing

as such adds something over and beyond the common, i.e.,

specific, nature?

Main protagonist: Scotus with his individual differences. The

main arguments stem from (i) the object of scientific

knowledge (viz., the common nature) and its distinction from

individuals that have that nature, and from (ii) reflection on the

idea that the common nature, which constitutes the essence of

the individual, is common to many individuals and so cannot

itself account for individuality, which must consequently be

traced to some other reality.

I. The nature of the question (nn. 1 & 7)

"In order to clarify what this [individual and singular unity] is, we

cannot do better than to explain what it adds over and above the

common nature, i.e., the nature that is conceived by us abstractly and

universally."

B. Negative : "The second position is the exact opposite, viz., that the

individual adds to the common nature nothing that is positive and real

and nothing that is distinct, either really or conceptually, from that

nature; rather, each thing or nature is per se an individual in an

unmediated and primary way."

"None of the authors doubts that the individual adds, over and beyond

the common nature, a certain negation that formally completes or

constitutes the unity of the individual. This is evident ... from what we

said above concerning the notion or nominal definition of an

individual. Indeed, if we are speaking formally about the individual

insofar as it is one in the relevant sense, it adds a negation in its

formal concept not only over and beyond the common nature

conceived of abstractly and universally, but even over and beyond the

whole singular entitas conceived of merely under a positive concept;

for this whole entitas is not conceived of as one in a singular and

individual way until it is conceived of as incapable of being divided

into many things that have the same notion."

Main protagonists: Ockham, Biel, and the other nominalists.

The main argument is that there is no conceivable thing that is

not singular and so it is absurd that an [already existent] thing

should become individual by the addition of some real thing

over and beyond the common nature. Also, this addition would

be either essential to the thing or accidental to it--and both

answers lead to absurdities.

C. Affirmative for material things and negative for spiritual things :

"The third position is able to make use of the distinction between

spiritual and material things. For in the case of immaterial things the

singular thing adds nothing over and beyond the common nature,

whereas in material things it does add something ... The foundation

for this position is the claim that since immaterial substances neither

have matter nor bespeak a relation to matter, it is impossible to

imagine anything in them which they add over and beyond the

essence, and so they are individuals by their very selves; by contrast,

in composite things designated matter is added, and from this matter

one can infer something that the individual adds over and beyond the

species."

"Therefore, the present problem is not about whether or not such a

negation formally pertains to the notion of this sort of unity ... Rather,

it is a problem about the ground for this negation . For since it does

not seem able to be grounded in the common nature (given that the

common nature is of itself indifferent and does not require such a lack

of divisibility into many similar things, but is indeed divided into

them), we are asking what it is within the singular and individual

thing by reason of which this negation belongs to it ."

So the question is: does individual unity add to the individual some

positive entity over and above the common nature, a positive entity

that grounds the indivisibility that defines individuality?

Main protagonists: Various Thomists (including St. Thomas?),

following Aristotle's dictum that in material things there is a

distinction between the essence ( quod quid est ) of a thing and

that which has the essence ( id cuius est ), whereas there is no

such distinction in immaterial things. The background idea is

that in the case of material things matter is in some way a

source of individuality.

II. Three popular positions on this question (nn. 2-6)

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