(Ebook - Pdf - Philosophy) Russell, Bertrand - The Problems Of Philosophy(1).pdf - English - inacosiegapisz

The Problems of Philosophy

Bertrand Russell

CONTENTS

I APPEARANCE AND REALITY

II THE EXISTENCE OR MATTER

III THE NATURE OF MATTER

IV IDEALISM

V KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE AND KNOWLEDGE BY DESCRIPTION

VI ON INDUCTION

VII ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES

VIII HOW A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE

IX THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS

X ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS

XI ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE

XII TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD

XIII KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE OPINION

XIV THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

XV THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

INDEX

PREFACE

IN the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those problems of

philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and

constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory

of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some

topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.

I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E. Moore and J. M.

Keynes: from the former, as regards the relations of sense-data to physical objects, and

from the latter as regards probability and induction. I have also profited greatly by the

criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.

1912

NOTE TO SEVENTEENTH IMPRESSION

WITH reference to certain statements on pages 44, 75, 131, and 132, it should be

remarked that this book was written in the early part of 1912 when China was still an

Empire, and the name of the then late Prime Minister did begin with the letter B.

1943

CHAPTER I

APPEARANCE AND REALITY

IS there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could

doubt it? This question, which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the

most difficult that can be asked. When we have realized the obstacles in the way of a

straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched on the study of

philosophy -- for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not

carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but

critically after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the

vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas.

In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to

be so full of apparent contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to

know what it is that we really may believe. In the search for certainty, it is natural to

begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt, knowledge is to be

derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences

make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair,

at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By

turning my head I see out of the window buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that

the sun is about ninety-three million miles from the earth; that it is a hot globe many

times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every morning, and

will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other

normal person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and

papers as I see, and that the table which I see is the same as the table which I feel

pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating,

except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be

reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure

that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true.

To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is

oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it

gives out a wooden sound. Any one else who sees and feels and hears the table will agree

with this description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty would arise; but as soon as

we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although I believe that the table is 'really' of

the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other

parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if I move, the

parts that reflect the light will be different, so that the apparent distribution of colours on

the table will change. It follows that if several people are looking at the table at the same

moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours, because no two

can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view

makes some change in the way the light is reflected.

For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter they are

all- important: the painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the

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