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Napoleon’s Maxims
Napoleon’s Maxims
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Napoleon’s Maxims
Table of Contents
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Napoleon’s Maxims
Introduction
(Based on the works of: Gen. Burnod, Paris 1827.)
Napoleon fought more battles than Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar combined.
He is, beyond any doubt, the greatest of European soldiers. He never wrote his
theories or principles on the conduct of war, although he often expressed the
intention of doing so and remarked that everyone would be surprised at how
simple they were.
Napoleon lived at a time when the possibilities of war had been increased
enormously. Saxe had formed divisions in his army, consisting of two brigades
of infantry and one of artillery, and had used them during an entire campaign.
Marshal de Broglie had adopted a permanent divisional organization in 1759
and had concentrated his army rapidly by the assembly of these units. The
divisional organization and marching in small columns of from 2000 to 4000
men permitted rapid deployment on the battlefield, whereas the old
procedures required six to eight hours to form a line of battle. Marshal de
Broglie had developed the principle of dispersion with units in supporting
distance, in camp and on the march, and concentration on the field of battle.
Gribeauval had reduced the weight and increased the mobility of artillery so
that it could manoeuvre with the infantry. Accurate maps were becoming
general, an important matter in the handling of large forces.
The theories by which all these changes could be utilized had been expounded
by Guibert, du Teil, and Bourcet. It remained for Napoleon alone, among the
generals of his time, to seize all these possibilities to their full and develop
from them a calculated system of strategy and a system of tactics calculated
with equal brilliance. No other general of his time realized these possibilities
until forced to learn by combating Napoleon.
He astounded his opponents by the crushing rapidity of his battles. He
marched against the enemy and his plan of battle was a part of his plan of
march. His strategical system, according to Captain J. Colin and General
Camon, were based on marching rapidly and secretly past the enemy's flank to
get on the hostile line of communications. This forced his opponent to turn and
fight at a disadvantage.
His tactical system, or scheme of battle, was based on a holding attack against
the enemy's front to keep them occupied, a wide envelopment or turning
movement on the enemy's rear with a small force to spread dismay and
confusion in the defender's ranks, and then the decisive blow. This was given
by a powerful attack, usually in the form of a close-in envelopment, which was
prepared by concentrated fire of a mass of artillery.
Napoleon constantly added to the amount of his artillery. In 1800 he organized
the horses and drivers of the artillery as part of the artillery batteries. Previous
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Napoleon’s Maxims
to this time the horses and drivers had been temporarily hired civilians, who
hauled the guns up to the battlefield, left them there, and returned to get
them after the battle was over. It is rather amusing that, even in recent days,
one of the common criticisms of Napoleon has been that he increased his
artillery. This was ascribed to the deterioration of his infantry in his later
career. The critics overlook the fact that small-arms fire had improved and that
the old offensive charge had become increasingly costly and less able to break
the lines of the defenders than it had been in the past. Napoleon used his
artillery in masses to break these lines, spread confusion, and prepare the way
for his infantry. The result was a material saving of lives for his infantry and
enhanced chance of victory.
Napoleon was the first great strategist of the western world. His battles were
the result of his strategically movements and were carefully calculated. The art
of strategy, as developed by writers for the past century, has its foundation in
his operations. Baron Jomini was the chief expounder of Napoleon's methods.
Clausewitz' great book, On War, was likewise an outgrowth of Napoleonic
studies. Jomini's work was the textbook for the conduct of the American Civil
War. It has been said that the Civil War was fought with Jomini in the pocket of
all the higher officers. Clausewitz' influence was felt most profoundly in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and in the I st World War.
Many collections of Napoleon's maxims and precepts have been made. The
present collection is both the first and the best selection of any small
collection. It was published in Paris in 1827 and almost immediately was
translated into German, English, Spanish, and Italian. Stonewall Jackson
carried these maxims in his haversack throughout his campaign. "This little
volume," states Col. G. F. R. Henderson, Jackson's biographer, "contains a
fairly complete exposition, in Napoleon's own words, of the grand principles of
war."
In his introduction, General Burnod, the compiler of these maxims, states:
"The art of war is susceptible of being considered under two titles: the one,
which rests entirely on the knowledge and genius of the commander; the
other, on matters of detail. The first is the same for all time, for all peoples,
whatever the arms with which they fight. From this it follows that the same
principles have directed the great captains of all centuries. The matters of
detail, on the contrary, are subject to the influence of time, to the spirit of the
people and the character of armaments."
The continuing interest and application of most of these maxims indicates that
the original compiler succeeded in selecting Napoleon's most pertinent
aphorisms of permanent value.
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Napoleon’s Maxims
PART I (1 – 79)
1. The frontiers of nations are either large rivers, or chains of mountains,
or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, deserts are
the most difficult to surmount; mountains come next; and large rivers
hold only the third rank.
2. A plan of campaign should anticipate everything that the enemy can
do, and contain within itself the means of thwarting him. Plans of
campaign may be infinitely modified according to the circumstances,
the genius of the commander, and the quality of the troops and the
topography of the theatre of war.
3. An army invading a country may either have its two wings resting on
neutral countries or on natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of
mountains; or it may have only one of its wings thus supported; or
both may be without support. In the first case, a general has only to
see that his line is not broken in front. In the second case, he must
rest on the wing that is supported. In the third case, he must keep his
different corps resting well on his centre and never allow them to
separate from it; for if it is a disadvantage to have two flanks in the
air, the inconvenience is doubled if there are four, tripled if there are
six; that is to say, if an army is divided into two or three distinct corps.
The line of operations in the first case may rest on the left or the right
wing, indifferently. In the second case, it should rest on the wing that
is supported. In the third case, it should fall perpendicularly on the
middle of the line formed by the army in marching. But in all the cases
above mentioned, it is necessary to have at every five or six days'
march, a fort or entrenched position, where magazines of provisions
and military stores may be established and convoys organized; and
which may serve as a centre of motion and a point of supply, and thus
shorten the line of operations.
4. It may be laid down as a principle that in invading a country with two
or three armies, each of which has its own distinct line of operations
extending towards a fixed point at which all are to unite, the union of
the different corps should never be ordered to take place in the vicinity
of the enemy, as by concentrating his forces he may not only prevent
their junction but also defeat them one by one.
5. All wars should be systematic, for every war should have an aim and
be conducted in conformity with the principles and rules of the art. War
should be undertaken with forces corresponding to the magnitude of
the obstacles that are to be anticipated.
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