Heidegger's Nazism.pdf

Inquiry ,43,271–88

Heidegger’sThoughtandNazism

FrederickA.Olafson

UniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego

ThisarticlerejectstheideathatHeidegger’sNazismderivesfromhisphilosophical

thought.Noconnectionhasconvincinglybeenshowntoholdbetweentheontological

apparatusof BeingandTime andanypoliticalorientation.Theelaborationofthe

conceptofbeinginthelaterworkneedstobeunderstoodasHeidegger’sown

reactiontotheactivismofhisearlierthoughtwhichintheabsenceofanyprincipleof

respectforotherhumanbeingscouldprovidenomoralbasisforresistancetoNazi

ideology.ThetensionsbetweenthecircumstancesofHeidegger’searlylife–rural,

conservative,andCatholic–andtheNietzscheanmodernismofhisphilosophical

thoughtareexplored.Itissuggestedthattherewereanalogoustensionsbetween

traditionandthemodernworldinNazismandthatitwasHeidegger’shatredofthat

worldthatledhimtorespondfavorablytosome(butnotall)ofthethemesofNazi

thought.

AgreatdealhasbeenwrittenaboutMartinHeidegger’sNazismandits

implicationsfortheinterpretationandevaluationofhisthought.Thereare

thosewhothinkthateverythinginHeidegger’swritingsistaintedbyhis

havingenlistedhimselfandhisphilosophyunderHitler’sbanners;othersare

equallysurethatnosuchconclusionfollowsfromwhatis,nevertheless,

concededtobeaterriblydiscreditableepisodeinhislife.Forthosewhothink,

asIdo,thatHeideggerwasagreatphilosopher,aconceptionofthecentral

inspirationofhisthoughtashavingacharacterakintothatofNazismmustbe

agrossmisrepresentation.Thosewhoargueforsuchajudgmentonhimpretty

muchdismisshisthoughtasanobfuscatedversionofhispoliticalviews.

Totheextentthatonecanjudge,thechargethatHeidegger’sproperly

philosophicalthoughtwascomplicitinhisNazismseemstomeanthatanyone

whoheldsuchviewswouldipsofactohavehadamotivetojointheNazi

party.Thereis,ofcourse,thequestionaboutwhattheNazipartyandAdolf

Hitlerrepresentedin1933andwhattheyhadcometostandforby1945.This

isadistinctionthatisnotusuallygivenalotofweightwhenindictmentslike

thoseofHeideggerarebeinghandeddown;andaNazipastisusuallytakento

implyassentto,ifnotcollaborationin,alltheworsthorrorsforwhichthat

regimewasresponsible.Thosewhomakethesechargestypicallyinsistthat

theevidenceofwhatNazismmeantwasthereforalltoseefromtheoutset.In

asensethatistrue,butonestillhastoaskhowwellpeoplewhosupportedthe

Nazisunderstoodtheirintentions.Thereisalsothepossibilitythatinthecase

ofathinkerlikeHeideggerhisownpersonalhistorymayhavecountedfor

morethanhissystemofthoughtforpurposesofexplainingapolitical

# 2000Taylor&Francis

272 FrederickA.Olafson

af Ž liation.Asthinkers,suchpeopleareverylikelytoclaim,asHeideggerdid,

thattheirthoughtmotivatedthedecisionstheymade;buttheirevidenceon

thispointisnotnecessarilyconclusive.Nor,Ithink,doesasubsequent

refusal,likeHeidegger’s,toadmitthatonewasinthewrongmakethecasefor

theprosecution,thoughitcertainlyre � ectsdiscreditonthepersonwhoso

refuses.

Theseareall-importantdistinctionsandsomeofthemhaveaclearbearing

ontheHeideggercase;butIamnotgoingtotrytoexoneratehim,even

partially,onanyofthesegrounds.Iacceptthefactthathisconductwas

morallyindefensible;andmyconcernwillbeentirelywiththerolehis

philosophicalthoughtmayhaveplayedinhisbecomingandremaininga

memberoftheNaziparty.Thethesisofthisarticlewillbethatalthoughthe

viewspresentedin BeingandTime couldnothavesuppliedasubstantive

motiveforbecomingaNazi,therewasaconnectionbetweentheNaziepisode

andHeidegger’sthought–aconnectionthathastobeunderstoodintermsofa

certaincounterpointbetweenhisthoughtandhislife.Whatneedstobe

understoodisthatbothhisthoughtandhislifeweremarkedbydualitiesthat

undoubtedlygeneratedseveretensions.Afullerexplorationofthesetensions

mayenableustorenderamorenuancedjudgmentontherelationbetween

NazismandHeidegger’sphilosophicalthought.Theessentialoriginalityand

powerofthatthoughtarenotputinquestionbytheargumentthatismade

here. 1

ThecaseagainstHeideggertendstogobackandforthbetween Beingand

Time ,togetherwiththewritingsthatfollowedcloselyuponit,andthosethat

cameduringandafterthefamous‘turn’or Kehre throughwhichhisthought

passedinthemid-1930s.Iwilldividemydiscussionaccordingly.Ingeneral,

theattemptsthathavebeenmadetoshowthattheprincipalthesesof Being

andTime ,his Ž rstmajorphilosophicalstatement,wereimplicatedinhis

movementtowardNazismhavebeenweaklysupportedatbest. 2 Itsimplyis

notpossibletoassociateapoliticalmessagewithconceptslikethoseofbeing-

in-the-worldortemporality;andtheonlyresultoftryingtodosoisusuallyto

obscuretheirproperlyphilosophicalimport.Nevertheless,adeepfault-line

doesrunthroughtheaccountofhumanchoiceandofourrelationswithone

anotherthatispresentedin BeingandTime ;andwhenitislocated,itmay

helpustoformatleastaroughideaofhowitwaspossibleforHeideggerto

seeNazismassomehowconvergingwithhisownphilosophicalposition.

Althoughthelaterwritingshavebeenahappyhunting-groundforthose

whowanttoindictbothHeideggerthemanandHeideggerthethinker,their

deepersigni Ž cancehas,Ithink,beenlostinthemidstofthisdetectivework.

Theirsigni Ž canceisnotthattheyprovidedarationaleforatotalitarian

orderingofsociety;itisratherthattheymarkareactiononHeidegger’spart

tocertainaspectsofhisownthoughtassetforthin BeingandTime .He

evidentlycametofeelthattheprojecttowhichthatworkwastocontribute

Heidegger’sThoughtandNazism 273

wasinfectedbyakindofNietzscheanhubris.Asaresult,ithadcometoo

closetothe‘subjectivism’thathethoughtwasendemicinmodern

philosophy. 3 ThesubjectivismHeideggerhadinmindcannothavebeenthe

epistemologicallymotivatedkindthatisassociatedwiththenamesof

DescartesandKant,since BeingandTime haddonesomuchtoputthatkind

ofphilosophyoutofbusiness.ForHeidegger,humanbeingwasindefeasibly

being-in-the-worldandthismeantthatitcouldnotwithdrawintoitselfor

adoptaskepticalattitudetowardthe‘external’world.Theissueof

subjectivismthatisrelevanttotheturnthatHeidegger’sthoughttookhad

todo,instead,withthewayinwhichselfandworldareassociatedwithone

anotherwithinbeing-in-the-world.

AccordingtoNietzsche,itistheselfthatsetsthesealofbeingonbecoming

andthusontheworld;anditslifeispreciselythisappropriative,meaning-

imposingactivity.EverythingintheaddressHeideggerdeliveredon

becomingRectoroftheUniversityofFreiburgaftertheNaziscameto

powerindicatesthatheunderstoodNazismasjustsuchahyper-activistic

responsetothehuman(andtheGerman)condition.Nazismwas,for

Heidegger,agrandioseenactmentofthesupremacyofthe(collective)self.

Thatwasalsowhathelaterwantedtorepudiate;anditishiscon � icting

attitudestowardanysuchexaltationoftheselfthatarethekeytoan

understandingofhisventureintothepoliticalworld.Accordingly,the

repudiationjustreferredtowasaddressednotinthe Ž rstinstancetoNazism

asapoliticalmovement,buttowhatitrepresentedinHeidegger’s

philosophicalinterpretationofit.Thisreactiontooktheformofan

extraordinaryalienationofallpersonalresponsibilityandfreedomandit

issuedinanextremequietism.Unfortunately,thereisadimensionofhuman

life–theproperlymoralone–thatisaseffectivelyobscuredinthisalienated

modeasitisintheassertionofself.

The Ž rstfactaboutHeideggertowhichattentionneedstobedrawnisthevery

greatantecedentimprobabilitythatabooklike BeingandTime wouldor

couldbewrittenbyanyonewhohadbeenformed,inhischildhoodandearly

life,asHeideggerwas.Hisupbringingwasrural,conservativeandCatholic;

andhiseducationwasintendedtopreparehimforthepriesthood.Initself,

thereisnothingunprecedentedaboutsomeone’sturningagainstthebeliefs

andvaluesofhisfamilyandhisbirthplaceandproducingworksofthoughtor

ofartthatexpressaverydifferentviewoftheworld.Heideggerdoesnot,

however,conformtoanyfamiliarimageoftherebel;andthereisevery

indicationthathistiestohisbirthplaceandtothewayoflifeitrepresented

remainedveryclose.Throughouthislife,hewasstronglycommittedtothe

274 FrederickA.Olafson

virtuesofthelittletownofMesskirch,wherehewasbornandwherehewas

buried,byspecialdispensation,intheCatholiccemetery.Thehistorian,Ernst

Nolte,hasevenaskedrhetoricallywhetherHeideggereverreallyleft

Messkirch. 4 Theanswer,Ithink,isthathedidindeedleaveit,butonaround-

tripticket;andintheend,intheonlywayheknew,hereturnedthereinspirit

aswell.Messkirch,andtheruralethosofhomeandtraditionitrepresented,

remainedforHeideggerthegreatsymbolicalternativetothehomelessnessof

modernlife–theurban,industrialworldthathedetested.Hedid,however,

rejecttheCatholicisminwhichhehadbeenreared.Sinceitformedthe

doctrinalcoreofthewayoflifetowhichhewassodeeplycommitted,

separatinghimselffromitcannothavebeeneasyforsuchaman.

Butseparatehimselfhedid;andhedidsomostemphaticallythroughthe

theseshesetforthin BeingandTime .Thatincompleteworkhasbeen

variouslyinterpreted;butitisclearthatitwasaradicallymodernwork.

Nothingshowsthismoreclearlythantheprofoundaf Ž nitywithNietzsche’s

thoughtthatiseverywhereevidentinit,ifnotinthedetailsofits

argumentationtheninthemoralatmospherethatpresidesovertheworkasa

whole.Heideggerhadalreadydeclaredphilosophyassuchtobecommittedto

atheism;andNietzsche’sconceptionofthedeathofGodwasadramatic

expressionofthenewsituationinwhichphilosophicalthoughthadtodoits

work.Itistruethat BeingandTime ,inmountingitspolemicagainstthe

subjectivismofmodernphilosophy,harksbacktosomeoftheancientsources

ofChristianandCatholicthought.Itdoesso,however,inthecontextofa

philosophicalprojectofanaltogetherdifferentkind.

ThethesesHeideggerdevelopedin BeingandTime havebeenmost

commonlyunderstoodintermsofthetreatmentofindividualhumanlifethat

seemedtobeimplicitintheprominenceassignedtonotionslikethoseof

‘authenticity’and‘anxiety’.Thesebecametheidentifyingthemes–almost

themood-music–ofHeidegger’sthoughtinthepublicmind;andthesame

couldbesaidoftheassignmentofeverydaylifeandits‘values’toan

anonymous,publicmodeofselfhoodthathecalled‘dasMan’.‘Authenticity’

and‘resoluteness’,bycontrast,wereexistentialvirtuesthatconsistedmainly

innotclaiminganyindependentorpriorformofjusti Ž cationforwhatone

does.WhatHeideggerobjectstoistheclaimhetakestobeimplicitinmoral

codes–theclaimthatthe‘values’theyarebasedonaresomehowinscribedin

theworlditselfandarethuspriortoandindependentofthechoiceswemake.

Fromthisitfollowsthatifwesimplycomplywitharule,whatwecallour

‘choice’willnotexpressanythingthatisdistinctivelyours.Bymakingit

appearthatwearechoosingwhenweare,atmost,goingalongwithan

anonymousdirectivethatisthechoiceofnoactualperson,weintroducean

elementoffalsityintoourlives.Inordertoliveauthenticallywehavetostop

playingdelusorygameswithourlivesthataremotivatedbytheaspirationto

confersomespeciousauthorityuponthem;andifthatrequiresadismissalof

Heidegger’sThoughtandNazism 275

alltraditionalconceptionsofmoraltruth,theHeideggerof BeingandTime

seemedtobewillingtoacceptthatconsequence.Thiswas,inanycase,the

messagethat BeingandTime carriedtotheworld;andinitsSartreanversion

itwasthecoreofthe‘existentialism’thatHeideggerwaslatertoreject.In

doingso,heseemedtosuggestthatithadbeentheresultofasimple

misunderstandingbySartreofwhat BeingandTime wasabout.

Thisrepudiationitselfneedsscrutiny.Itdatesfrom1948andthusfroma

time,wellintohislaterperiod,whenHeideggerhadsetasidemanyofthe

themesofthatworkthatSartrehadappropriated.Itistruethatthereare

signi Ž cantdifferencesbetweenHeidegger’saccountofhumanbeingas

DaseinandtheradicallyvoluntaristiccharacterittakesoninSartre’s

rendering.Heideggersurelywouldnothavewantedtoassociatehimselfwith

apositionthatcarriedviewshehadhimselflargelyabandonedtonew

extremes.Nevertheless,asitstands,thepicturethat BeingandTime givesus

ofhumanlifeiscenteredontheindividualhumanbeingandonthe

alternativesofauthenticityandinauthenticitybywhichthatlifeisde Ž ned.As

farashumansociety–whatpeoplearelikeandwhattheydointheir

associationwithoneanother–isconcerned,inauthenticityappearstobethe

dominantmodalityoftheircommonlife.Asaresult,societyisunderstoodby

HeideggerprincipallyasanegationofeverythingthatcouldmakewhatIdo

trulymineandthussomethingforwhichIwouldberesponsible.Theonly

principleofauthorityforwhat‘one’doesresidessimplyinthefactthatitis,

anonymously,thedonething.Anindividualhumanbeingwhotriestoemerge

fromthisregimeofconformismintoaformoflifeinwhichthereistrue

choiceandthusresponsibilityandfreedomcandosoonlyonthestrengthof

thecallof‘conscience’thatturnsouttobehisownvoiceremindinghimthat

heiscapableofauthenticagencyinhisownright.Butwhyhewoulddosoor

beabletodosoremainslargelyunexplained.

ItseemsfairtoassumethatHeideggermusthavefeltaneedtodevelopa

conceptionofapossiblesocietyinwhichauthenticitywouldsomehowat

leastpartiallyreplacetheinauthenticitythatwasthesignatureoftheexisting

socialorder.(Heideggerinsists,forreasonsthatneednotbediscussedhere,

thattherecanbenoquestionofalife,individualorsocial,thatisunalloyedly

authentic.)Thereis,infact,onesectionin BeingandTime inwhichhis

thoughtseemstobemovinginthisdirectionandsuggeststhepossibilityofa

conceptionofsocietyassomethingotherthananincubatorforinauthenticity.

Heideggergivesasketchofwhathecalls Mitsein –thewayinwhichhuman

beingsarewithoneanotherintheirownsharedmodeofbeing. 5 Thisisa

modeofbeingthatisconstitutedbythedisclosureofotherentities–things

andpeople–aswellasself.Thereareclearindicationsthatinthecaseofthe

disclosureofotherlikebeingssucharelationhasatleastaproto-moral

characterasforexamplewhenHeideggersaysthatweare‘essentiallyforthe

sakeofothers’. 6 Inmyjudgment,thesehintscouldhavebeendevelopedinto

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