islam i pakistan w przyszłości.pdf

Husain Haqqani

The Role of Islam in

Pakistan’s Future

A lthough listed among the U.S. allies in the war on terrorism,

Pakistan cannot easily be characterized as either friend or foe. Indeed, Paki-

stan has become a major center of radical Islamist ideas and groups, largely

because of its past policies toward India and Afghanistan. Pakistan sup-

ported Islamist militants fighting Indian rule in the disputed territory of

Jammu and Kashmir and backed the Taliban in its pursuit of a client regime

in Afghanistan. Since the September 11 attacks, however, the selective co-

operation of Pakistan’s president and military ruler, Gen. Pervez Musharraf,

in sharing intelligence with the United States and apprehending Al Qaeda

members has led to the assumption that Pakistan might be ready to give up

its long-standing ties with radical Islam.

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s status as an Islamic ideological state is rooted

deeply in history and is linked closely both with the praetorian ambitions of

the Pakistani military and the Pakistani elite’s worldview. For the foresee-

able future, Islam will remain a significant factor in Pakistan’s politics.

Musharraf and his likely successors from the ranks of the military will con-

tinue to seek U.S. economic and military assistance with promises of reform,

but the power of such promises is tempered by the strong links between

Pakistan’s military-intelligence apparatus and extremist Islamists.

Pakistan’s future direction is crucial to the U.S.-led war on terrorism, not

least because of Pakistan’s declared nuclear weapons capability. The historic

alliance between Islamists and Pakistan’s military has the potential to frus-

trate antiterrorist operations, radicalize key segments of the Islamic world,

and bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war yet again. Unless Pakistan’s

all-powerful military can be persuaded to cede power gradually to secular ci-

Husain Haqqani is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace in Washington, D.C.

Institute of Technology

The Washington Quarterly • 28:1 pp. 85–96.

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l Husain Haqqani

vilians and allow the secular politics of competing economic and regional

interests to prevail over religious sentiment, the country’s vulnerability to

radical Islamic politics will not wane. With the backing of the U.S. govern-

ment, the Pakistani military would probably be able to maintain a façade of

stability over the next several years but, bolstered by U.S. support, would

also want to maintain preeminence and is likely to make concessions to Is-

lamists to legitimize its control of the country’s polity. The United States is

supporting Pakistan’s military so that Pakistan backs away from Islamist

radicalism, albeit gradually. In the process, however, the military’s political

ambitions are being encouraged, compromising change and preserving the

influence of radical Islamists. Democratic reform that allows secular politi-

cians to compete for power freely is more likely to reduce this influence.

Weakness of the Pakistani State

The disproportionate focus of the Pakistani state since its independence in

1947 on ideology, military capability, and external alliances has weakened

Pakistan internally. The country’s institutions, ranging from schools and

universities to the judiciary, are in a state of general decline. The economy’s

stuttering growth is dependent largely on the level of concessional flows of

external resources. Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) stands at about

$75 billion in absolute terms and $295 billion in purchasing power parity,

making Pakistan’s economy the smallest of any country that has tested

nuclear weapons thus far. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemploy-

ment, rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per capita income. One-

third of the population lives below the poverty line, and another 21 percent

subsists just above it.

Soon after independence, 16 percent of Pakistan’s population was liter-

ate, compared with 18 percent of India’s significantly larger population. By

2003, India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65 percent, but Pakistan’s

stood at only about 35 percent. Today, Pakistan allocates less than 2 percent

of its GDP for education and ranks close to the bottom among 87 develop-

ing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate

and inadequate investment in education has led to a decline in Pakistan’s

technological base, which in turn hampers the country’s economic modern-

ization. With an annual population growth rate of 2.7 percent, the state of

public health care and other social services in Pakistan is also in decline.

Meanwhile, Pakistan spends almost 5 percent of its GDP on defense and is

still unable to match the conventional forces of India, which outspends Pa-

kistan 3 to 1 while allocating less than 2.5 percent of its GDP to military

spending.

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The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future l

Pakistan’s military dominance can be traced back to the early years of its

statehood. The partition of British India’s assets in 1947 left Pakistan with

one-third of the British Indian army and only 17 percent of its revenues.

Thus, the military started out as the dominant institution in the new state,

and this dominance has continued over the years. Since Gen. Ayub Khan

assumed power in 1958, ruling through martial law, the military has directly

or indirectly dominated Pakistani politics, set Pakistan’s ideological and na-

tional security agenda, and repeatedly intervened to direct the course of do-

mestic politics. On four occasions, despite the

constant rewriting of its constitution ostensi-

bly to pave the way for sustained democracy,

generals seized power directly, claiming that

civilian politicians were incapable of running

the country. Even during periods of civilian

government, the generals have exercised po-

litical influence through the intelligence appa-

ratus, notably the Interservices Intelligence

(ISI) organization. The ISI plays a behind-the-

scenes role in exaggerating political divisions

to justify military intervention. Partly due to the role of the military and

partly because of their own weakness, Pakistan’s political factions have often

found it difficult to cooperate with one another or to submit to the rule of

law. As a result, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent system form of

government, with persisting political polarization along three major, inter-

secting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different eth-

nic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.

The first crack in contemporary Pakistan’s body politic continues to be

this perennial dispute over who should wield political power. Musharraf has

described Pakistan as “a very difficult country to govern” 1 in view of its

myriad internal and external difficulties. Musharraf’s view reflects the think-

ing of the Pakistani military and is possibly self-serving. The military does

not allow politics to take its course, periodically accusing elected leaders of

compromising national security or of corruption. Repeated military inter-

vention has deprived Pakistan of political leaders with experience governing,

leading to serious lapses under civilian rule. Because the military periodically

co-opts or fires civilian politicians, established and accepted rules for politi-

cal conduct have failed to evolve. Issues such as the role of religion in mat-

ters of state, the division of power between various branches of government,

and the authority of the provinces are not settled by constitutional means or

through a vote. The military does not let civilians rule, but its own rule

lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the general public, creating an atmosphere of

I slam will remain a

significant factor in

Pakistan’s politics

for the foreseeable

future.

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l Husain Haqqani

permanent friction. Thus, instead of governing, Pakistan’s rulers, including

Musharraf, have been reduced to managing ethnic, religious, and provincial

tensions.

The second major source of conflict in Pakistan is based on these ethnic

and provincial differences. Although the majority of Pakistan’s ethnically dis-

parate population has traditionally identified with secular politicians, that ma-

jority has not always determined the direction of Pakistan’s policies, even

when its opinion is expressed in a free and fair election. Highly centralized

and unrepresentative governance has created grievances among different eth-

nic groups, and the state has yet to create any institutional mechanisms for

dealing with such discontent. The constitutional provisions relating to pro-

vincial autonomy, which could placate each province by allowing self-govern-

ment, have often been bypassed in practice. Intraprovincial differences, such

as those between the Baluchis and the Pashtuns in Baluchistan, between the

Punjabis and Saraiki in Punjab, between the Pashtuns and Hindko speakers in

the North West Frontier Province, and between the Sindhis and Mohajirs in

Sindh, have also festered without political resolution.

The third relates to the ideological division over the role of Islam in na-

tional life. Having started out as a pressure group outside the Pakistani par-

liament, Pakistan’s religious parties have now become a well-armed and

well-financed force that wield considerable influence within different

branches of government. Religious groups have benefited from the patron-

age of the military and civil bureaucracy, which has viewed them as useful

tools in perpetuating the military’s control over foreign and domestic policy.

Because the Islamist worldview is incompatible with the vision of a modern

Pakistan, the violent vigilantism of some Islamists has become a serious

threat to Pakistani civil society and has also promoted sectarian terrorism.

Operating outside the framework of the rule of law, the Islamists have the

potential to disrupt the conduct of foreign policy, especially in view of their

support for anti-India militants in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Islam and the Rise of Militancy

Radical Islamic groups, which portray themselves as the guardians of Pakistan’s

ideology, have had a special status conferred on them by the military and

civil bureaucracy that normally governs Pakistan. The Islamists claim that

they are the protectors of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capability, as well as

the champion of the national cause of securing Kashmir for Pakistan. Secu-

lar politicians who seek greater autonomy for Pakistan’s different regions or

demand that religion be kept out of the business of the state have come un-

der attack from the Islamists for deviating from Pakistan’s ideology.

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The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Future l

Establishing Islam as the state ideology was a device aimed at defining a

Pakistani identity during the country’s formative years. Indeed, Pakistan’s

leaders started playing on religious sentiment as a means of strengthening

the country’s national identity shortly after Pakistan’s inception. Emerging

from the partition of British India in 1947 as the result of a relatively short

independence movement, Pakistan faced several challenges to its survival,

beginning with India’s perceived reluctance to accept Pakistan’s creation.

Pakistan’s secular elite used Islam as a national rallying cry against perceived

and real threats from predominantly Hindu

India. They assumed that the country’s cler-

ics and Islamists were too weak and too de-

pendent on the state to confront the power

structure. Therefore, unsure of their fledgling

nation’s future, the politicians, civil servants,

and military officers who led Pakistan in its

formative years decided to exacerbate the an-

tagonism between Hindus and Muslims that

had led to partition as a means of defining a

distinctive identity for Pakistan, with “Islamic

Pakistan” resisting “Hindu India.” Notwithstanding periodic peace processes,

hostility between India and Pakistan continues, and in Pakistan it serves as

an important element of national identification.

This political commitment to an “ideological state” gradually evolved

into a strategic commitment to exporting jihadist ideology for regional influ-

ence. During the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, the Pakistani military used Is-

lamist rhetoric and the help of Islamist groups to exclude elected secular

leaders supported by the majority Bengali-speaking population from power

in East Pakistan prior to its secession. The Bengalis’ rebellion, with India’s

assistance, and their brutal suppression by the Pakistani military followed an

election that would have given power to Bengali politicians in a united Paki-

stan. After the 1971 war, Pakistan was bifurcated with the birth of an inde-

pendent Bangladesh, exacerbating Pakistan’s insecurity.

Whereas India and Bangladesh have each evolved as secular democracies

focused on economic development, Pakistan continues to be ruled by a civil-

military oligarchy that sees itself as defining and also protecting the state’s

identity, mainly through a mix of religious and militarist nationalism. Hence,

in western Pakistan, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan’s

disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion assumed greater sig-

nificance, and its manifestations became more militant. Religious groups,

armed or unarmed, gradually became more powerful as a result of this alli-

ance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifesta-

P akistan’s religious

parties have now

become a well-

armed and well-

financed force.

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