23-A REEXAMINATION.pdf

A Reexamination of Critical Buddhism

S UEKI Fumihiko

T HE TERM “ CRITICAL BUDDHISM ” was used by Hakamaya Noriaki as

the title of a 1990 book in which he de³nes it as the position

that “Buddhism is criticism” or that “only that which is critical is

Buddhism.” Hakamaya further uses the term “critical philosophy” to dis-

tinguish it from “topical philosophy.” For the purposes of this essay, I

shall employ the term “Critical Buddhism” to refer to a movement in

Buddhist scholarship that is represented by Hakamaya and one of his col-

leagues at Komazawa University, Matsumoto Shirõ, and that is charac-

terized by its critique of traditional attitudes in Japanese Buddhist studies.

Strictly speaking, the positions of the two are not identical, but since they

have collaborated so closely and have had considerable inµuence on one

another, it does not seem out of place to treat them under the same

rubric. I would also note that whereas the label of “Critical Buddhism”

has been widely used among Buddhist scholars in the United States, this

is not the case in Japan.

Although Hakamaya and Matsumoto prepared a number of critical

studies in the early 1980s, they began to publish their main work in 1985.

In that year Hakamaya released a number of important articles that were

later to be included in his well-known book Critiques of the Doctrine of

Original Enlightenment . It was in 1986, when Matsumoto read his paper

“The Doctrine of Tath„gata-garbha Is Not Buddhist” at the annual

meeting of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, that

Critical Buddhism ³rst caused a stir in Japanese Buddhist studies. 1 In the

aftermath Hakamaya and Matsumoto churned out one essay after the

other, many of which were subsequently collected and published as sepa-

rate volumes: Hakamaya’s Critiques (1989), Critical Buddhism (1990),

Dõgen and Buddhism (1992); and Matsumoto’s Prat‡tyasamutp„da and

Emptiness (1989) and Critical Studies on Zen Thought (1994).

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SUEKI FUMIHIKO

The response in Japanese academic circles to their criticisms was

mixed. A few scholars reacted positively, but most scholars withheld

approval. Hakamaya and Matsumoto (especially Hakamaya) made no pre-

tense to objectivity and politeness in presenting their ideas, but rode

roughshod over the customs of Japanese academia, setting forth their

subjective opinions in a bold and forthright manner, attacking other

scholars head-on, and not infrequently using disparaging language. This

was part of a strategy aimed at insuring that the issues they raised would

not be ignored or get swept aside in the general current of minute schol-

arly problems. From the start, they wanted public attention and debate.

Their strategy succeeded and catapulted their names into promi-

nence. But at the same time, their radical and aggressive attitude incurred

the anger of most Japanese scholars and led to the unfortunate result that

their underlying intentions were neither understood nor discussed for a

rather long period. The handful of scholars who stood up for them

included some of their colleagues at Komazawa University like Ishii

Shðdõ and Itõ Takatoshi, who were able to read between the lines of the

exaggerations of Hakamaya and Matsumoto. Perhaps the only person to

respond seriously to their criticism in the early stages was Tsuda Shin’ichi,

a somewhat unique scholar specializing in esoteric Buddhism. Most

scholars simply ignored them, preferring not to get involved rather than

to court danger. Critical Buddhism became the sort of issue in Japanese

Buddhist scholarship that everyone knew about, but few discussed openly.

Scholars in the United States, unaffected by the taboos of Japanese acade-

mia, took a more open-minded approach. The 1993 meeting of the

American Academy of Religion included a panel on Critical Buddhism.

In any event, after Hakamaya and Matsumoto had ³nished the ³rst

stage of their work, Japanese scholars eventually began to take up the

questions they were raising. In 1994 the Association of Buddhist

Philosophy published a special issue of its Journal of Buddhist Studies in

commemoration of ten years of the establishment of the association. In

the lead article Takasaki Jikidõ, the president of the association, made a

survey of Buddhist studies in Japan over the past ten years, devoting more

than half of his treatment to Critical Buddhism. 2 This left no doubt that

he considered it to be the principal issue in the previous decade of

Japanese Buddhist studies. In addition to the comments of Takasaki, arti-

cles by Maeda Egaku, Yoshizu Yoshihide, and Tsuda Shin’ichi in the same

volume also took up the question. The taboo had begun to lift.

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REEXAMINATION OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

In this essay, I would like to begin with an overview of the issues

raised by Critical Buddhism and the responses to it by Japanese scholars,

and then go on to brieµy outline my own participation in this debate and

my current views on this issue.

ASSERTIONS AND SCHOLARLY REACTIONS

Hakamaya’s Ideas

In contrast to Matsumoto Shirõ, who usually approaches questions from

an academic standpoint, Hakamaya often reverts to a journalistic style.

His thoughts range broadly across a number of issues at the same time,

weaving a complex web of connections that is not always easy to follow.

Paul Swanson has distinguished three levels in the critique of Hakamaya

and Matsumoto (see pages 27–8 above): the Buddhological, the sectari-

an, and the social-critical. I would like to add a fourth: the philosophical.

THE SECTARIAN LEVEL

An important stimulus to Hakamaya and Matsumoto’s promotion of

Critical Buddhism came from their participation in a committee formed

to study the problem of discrimination in the Sõtõ sect. Japanese

Buddhism has long lent support to social discrimination—even from

before the Tokugawa period—and contemporary Buddhism has come to

recognize the need for self-examination in this regard. In contrast to the

Jõdo Shin sect, whose ³ght against discrimination has a comparatively

long history, the Sõtõ sect has lagged behind. It was only after a discrim-

inatory statement issued by the leaders of the Sõtõ sect attracted wide-

spread public attention that the sect began to take up the question in

earnest. 3 The writings of Hakamaya and others on this question need to

be read in this light.

Hakamaya concluded that the traditional doctrines that supported

discrimination in the Sõtõ sect had derived from the monistic view of the

hongaku shisõ or the doctrine of “original enlightenment.” This explains

in part his vehement attacks against hongaku thought. In its place, he pro-

motes what may be called the “Protestant character” of Critical Bud-

dhism, insisting on the need to modernize the teachings of the Sõtõ sect,

which has lagged far behind in terms of facing discriminatory elements in

its own tradition past and present.

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SUEKI FUMIHIKO

Naturally, the critique of traditional doctrines means grappling with

the philosophy of Dõgen, the founder of the Sõtõ sect. The “new” idea

that Hakamaya proposes is that the main subject of the Shõbõgenzõ ,

Dõgen’s magnum opus, is a criticism of hongaku shisõ . He further argues

that the 12-fascicle version of the Shõbõgenzõ , hitherto neglected, should

be reinstated as Dõgen’s consummate contribution. 4 The idea that the

“Bendõwa,” the prologue of the Shõbõgenzõ , contains a criticism of

Tendai hongaku thought is, of course, nothing new. Scholars outside the

Sõtõ tradition such as Hazama Jikõ and Tamura Yoshirõ have made this

point often in the past. But prior to the publications by Yamauchi Shun’yð

in 1985, there had been no public acknowledgment of the fact within the

Sõtõ sect. Hakamaya developed Yamauchi’s ideas and argued that the

hongaku thought criticized by Dõgen is not restricted to a tendency of

the Japanese Tendai school, but is a way of thinking broadly accepted in

Japan. He added that this criticism of hongaku thought is not merely the

subject of one passage of the “Bendõwa,” but constituted the main sub-

ject of the whole of the Shõbõgenzõ . From his standpoint, the 75-fascicle

Shõbõgenzõ , which has been accepted as the core of Dõgen’s philosophy,

contains traces of the inµuence of hongaku thought and is thus inferior to

the 12-fascicle Shõbõgenzõ of Dõgen’s later years, where Hakamaya ³nds a

more decisive stand against hongaku thought.

THE BUDDHOLOGICAL LEVEL

Hakamaya’s criticism of hongaku thought is not restricted to the sectarian

level but encompasses a wide range of studies in the history of Buddhist

thought. Hongaku thought in the narrower sense refers to a tendency

within the Tendai school in medieval Japan characterized by the absolute

af³rmation of the phenomenal world, and occasionally referred to as

“Tendai hongaku thought.” Hongaku thought in the wider sense refers to

tendencies in Buddhist philosophy to attach importance to the idea of

“original enlightenment” as a result of the inµuence of the Awakening of

Mahayana Faith .

Hakamaya’s de³nition of hongaku thought is broader still. His

de³nition includes three elements:

1. the assumption of substantial “place” ( topos ), usually mixed with non-

Buddhist native or indigenous thought;

2. an ideology that is linked to authoritarianism and self-af³rmation;

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REEXAMINATION OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

3. an attitude that makes light of the intellect and attaches importance

to the “experience” of enlightenment.

In contrast, he proposes three de³ning traits of genuine Buddhism:

1. the idea of causation that is critical of the idea of substantial place;

2. the idea of self-negation and altruism based upon the idea of no-self;

3. the doctrine of dependent causality based on the faith and intellect. 5

In this way, Hakamaya expands the meaning of the term hongaku

thought to include not only indigenous anti-Buddhist elements in

Buddhist history, but also non-Buddhist indigenous ideas that have

inµuenced such anti-Buddhist elements within Buddhism. These are not

restricted to Japan but are also to be found in India and China. According

to Hakamaya, Buddhism becomes true Buddhism when it criticizes hon-

gaku thought in this very broad sense.

Hakamaya’s rede³nition of hongaku thought has close parallels to

Matsumoto’s treatment of the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha , and in fact

was clearly inµuenced by it. But unlike Matsumoto, who tries to clarify

the fundamental ideas of Buddhism, Hakamaya’s main interest is to criti-

cize tendencies in Japan. This is why he focuses on hongaku thought

rather than the doctrine of tath„gata-garbha .

Both Hakamaya and Matsumoto are specialists in Tibetan Buddhism

who studied under Yamaguchi Zuihõ, Japan’s foremost Tibetologist. In

the sense that Yamaguchi criticizes Buddhism in East Asia from the stand-

point of Tibetan Buddhism, the Critical Buddhism of Hakamaya and

Matsumoto may be considered a further development of Yamaguchi’s

position. 6

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEVEL

The term “critical” in Critical Buddhism derives from the Italian philoso-

pher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who referred to the philosophy of

Descartes as a “critical philosophy” to contrast it with his own “topical

philosophy.” Hakamaya, in contrast, sets out to criticize topical philo-

sophy from the critical standpoint. For him, the “critical” represents

true Buddhism, and the “topical” standpoint corresponds to hongaku

thought. His support of the Cartesian critical attitude shows that his

approach stands closer to modern rationalism than it does to either pre-

modern irrational approaches or postmodern criticism. For those conver-

sant with modern Japanese philosophy, the talk of “topos” or “place”

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