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Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Biodefense Research
Chapter 24
ETHICAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS IN
BIODEFENSE RESEARCH
JEFFREY E. STEPHENSON, P h D * ; a n d ARTHUR O. ANDERSON, MD
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF BIODEFENSE DEVELOPMENT
AND MEDICAL ETHICS
Biodefense and Ethics in the 18th and 19th Centuries
Biodefense, Ethics, and Research in the 20th Century
IMPACT OF REGULATING AGENCIES ON STRATEGIC RESEARCH
CONFLICT BETWEEN REGULATIONS AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Department of Defense/Food and Drug Administration Memorandum of
Understanding (1987)
Investigational New Drug Status of Vaccines
Summary Points
OPTIONS FOR FULFILLING MISSION AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES
TO MILITARY PERSONNEL
Option 1: Continue to Use Investigational New Drug Products Without
Full Compliance
Option 2: Negotiate for Accelerated Licensure
Option 3: Institute Waiver of Informed Consent
CURRENT MOVEMENTS IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002
The Animal Efficacy Rule
BioShield Act of 2004
The Turner Bill
Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005
SUMMARY
* Regulatory Compliance Specialist, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Telemedicine and Advanced Technology Research Center, Fort
Detrick, Maryland 21702; formerly, Institutional Review Board Administrator, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425 Porter
Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland
Colonel, Medical Corps, US Army (Ret); Director, Office of Human Use and Ethics, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425
Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland
559
 
Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare
INTRODUCTION
The anthrax attacks of October 2001 made the nation
acutely aware of not just the possibility of a large-
scale biological weapons attack on US soil, but also
has brought to the forefront concerns over the proper
measures to be implemented to prepare for such
biological warfare scenarios. It is evident that drugs
and vaccines may be needed immediately to respond
appropriately to emergency or battle situations.
Government regulatory agencies, the pharmaceutical
industry, and the armed services must work together
more effectively so that vaccines and drugs that are
not yet approved for marketing but have preclinical
evidence of efficacy may be considered and used in
the event of bioterrorist attacks or in times of war.
The pharmaceutical industry is not accustomed to
responding to such situations; it is in the business of
developing drugs to treat natural diseases afflicting
patients of the civilian healthcare industry. Profit
considerations and sustained business growth are,
understandably, the primary objectives of pharma-
ceutical companies, so drugs are more likely to be
developed for common rather than rare diseases. For
such naturally occurring, often relatively common
diseases, many potential test subjects are ready and
willing to participate in drug safety and efficacy trials
because of the possibility that the new drug might
cure their diseases or help future patients.
This is not the case for products required as coun-
termeasures against biological warfare agents. These
infectious disease agents and toxins are usually found
in areas of the world where humans have learned it is
not safe to settle, or they occur in sporadic, small epi-
demics that kill everyone affected and fail to spread.
In any case, there are rarely enough “naturally”
occurring disease outbreaks of this kind to conduct
clinical trials yielding substantial evidence of human
clinical efficacy.
Over the past 60 years the conditions that must be
met in order to use many of these drugs and vaccine
products have become more restrictive. Until the ap-
proval of an animal efficacy rule and passage of the
Project BioShield Act of 2004, Food and Drug Admin-
istration (FDA) regulations originating in the 1938
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act made emergent medical
responses to bioterrorist attacks extremely complex by
prohibiting use of investigational products until there
was substantial evidence of human clinical efficacy.
Gathering evidence in a scientifically valid clinical trial
requires the participation of large numbers of subjects
who have or are at risk of acquiring the disease, and
accumulating these clinical observations takes a long
time. Although some disease agents cause sporadic
epidemics, others only infect individuals randomly
when they happen upon a reservoir of contagion.
Biowarfare attacks involving these uncommon agents
would likely affect many people suddenly, permitting
neither the opportunity to enroll enough subjects in a
study nor the time for observation. Although FDA re-
strictions are meant to protect the public from possible
harm, delaying use of potentially beneficial products
until outcomes are known can be detrimental in the
event of a widespread biowarfare attack. Throughout
most of the 20th century and into the 21st century,
successful animal studies followed by substantial evi-
dence of efficacy from human clinical trials have been
required before a drug could be approved for market.
In an emergency, however, it may be beneficial to allow
animal study evidence to suffice if the circumstances
cannot permit valid human clinical trials.
Current regulations governing research related to
biodefense development cover a wide swath of legal
and ethical ground. However, the relationship between
the military and the FDA is a complex one, partly be-
cause of the institutions’ different missions. The FDA
regulates the manufacture, testing, promotion, and
commerce of medical products, and it makes a legal
distinction between products that are approved and
not approved for marketing. Products not approved for
marketing are classified as investigational new drugs
(INDs). FDA regulations specify what is necessary to
change from the latter status to the former.
Because members of the armed services are at the
greatest risk for biowarfare attack, it is prudent for the
military to research and develop effective biological
defenses that may also be used for treatment in the
civilian population in an emergency. But in the military
context, FDA regulations pose three significant legal
hurdles to the military’s ethical responsibility to pro-
tect military personnel. First, because diseases that are
potential weapons, such as Ebola or Rift Valley fever ,
are both rare in nature and can be life threatening, it is
immoral to conduct clinical trials to determine clinical
efficacy because of the inherent risk to participants.
Second, outside of clinical trials, the systematic use of
INDs (as opposed to single use instances) in emergency
life-threatening situations, is illegal. Third, it is illegal to
systematically use licensed drugs in large numbers of
persons for uses other than those indicated on the label.
Ultimately, however, researchers must find ways to cir-
cumvent these limitations so that the FDA and Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) can fulfill their respective execu-
tive branch responsibilities while minimizing conflicts.
Federal regulations serve as practical and praise-
worthy legal and ethical safeguards for the conduct of
human subjects research. However, as detailed above,
regulations governing the conduct of human subjects
560
Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Biodefense Research
research can also have the unintended consequence
of slowing the development and advancement of
biodefense-related medicine. When the letter of the
law is applied, the interests of military personnel may
be lost in the shuffle, leaving the following ethical
dilemma: on one hand, the military has the duty to
adhere to regulations and obey the country’s laws;
on the other hand, the military has the duty to use all
available means to protect its personnel and civilians
and accomplish the mission at hand. Some way to
bridge the two horns of this dilemma is needed; in
particular, there must be a legal way to make protec-
tive drugs and vaccines available when the normally
required clinical trials cannot be carried out.
This chapter will demonstrate ways to protect mili-
tary personnel and possibly even the civilian popula-
tion. The history of the development of biodefense in
military medicine and the ethics of biomedical research
will be covered. In addition, a summary of the evolution
of regulations that influence or inform human subjects
research, including research intended and designed in
part to meet the needs of the military personnel, will be
presented. Then an analysis and discussion of the con-
flict between regulatory requirements and adherence to
ethical principles in the military setting will demonstrate
three options the DoD might pursue in relation to the
issues outlined. Some of the legislated solutions recently
proposed or implemented will also be included.
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF BIODEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND MEDICAL ETHICS
Advances in biomedical research have led to
considerable breakthroughs in the treatment of
diseases that military personnel face. Although
the focus of this chapter is on biodefense, the his-
tory of research to protect military personnel from
disease has frequently targeted naturally occurring
diseases unfamiliar to US troops. The need for de-
velopment of medical treatment in military settings
has frequently been the impetus for conceptual
breakthroughs in the ethics of human participation
in research. Biomedical research involving human
subjects in military research facilities must be con-
ducted with oversight from an institutional review
board (IRB), per 32 CFR 219.109. 1 Acknowledgment
of ethical dimensions in biodefense research requires
the cooperation of all military personnel. However,
the ethical principles that serve as the foundations
of current ethical practices in military medical re-
search did not come about de novo, and neither did
the biodefenses and protections. Military medical
ethics standards evolved over centuries, often in
tandem with or in reaction to biodefense needs, or in
response to ethical lapses or controversies. At times
the military has assumed the lead in establishing
human subjects research ethics precedence.
placed into crowded camps, mingling with local civil-
ian populations, which expanded variola transmission
even further into vulnerable populations. 3 Washing-
ton proclaimed smallpox to be his “most dangerous
enemy,” and by 1777 he had all his soldiers variolated
before beginning new military operations. In doing
so, Washington fulfilled the ethical responsibility of
ensuring the health of his military personnel, which
in turn served to fulfill his professional responsibility
as commander of a military force to preserve the na-
tion. However, his actions were criticized by a public
unfamiliar with the stakes or conditions weighing on
this choice (Figure 24-1).
Biodefense and Ethics in the 18th and 19th Centuries
In 1766, while still a general for England, George
Washington and his soldiers were unable to take Que-
bec in the French and Indian War. In part this failure
was due to smallpox outbreaks that affected his troops. 2
Later when Washington led Continental Army troops
against the British, a smallpox epidemic reduced his
healthy troop strength to half while the British troops,
who had been variolated, were already immune to
the spreading contagion. Troops were often gathered
together from remote parts of the fledgling nation and
Fig. 24-1. George Cruikshank, Vaccination against Small Pox or
Mercenary and Merciless spreaders of Death and Devastation
driven out of Society! London, England: SW Fores, 1808. Gen-
eral George Washington was strongly criticized in the press
because of the risks and his decision to go ahead with forced
variolation despite concerns. A political cartoon, published in
the 1800s, shows how critically forced variolation was seen by
the public despite the Army’s intent to benefit its soldiers.
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Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare
Advances in military medicine and hygiene
developed through experiences gained in battlefield
medicine during the American Civil War were adapted
as standards of medical care during the latter part of
the 19th century. New medical schools such as Johns
Hopkins sought advice about the most advanced
patient care facilities, medical practices, and medical
treatment lessons learned on the battlefield. The most
direct evidence of the influence of military medicine
on standard medical care practice is provided by John
Shaw Billings. 4 While serving in the office of the Army
surgeon general, he designed the Johns Hopkins Hos-
pital building, applying concepts he learned about the
importance of hygiene, light, and ventilation while
evaluating medical care in Civil War field hospitals.
Billings also created an indexing system for medi-
cal publications that was used for the Army surgeon
general’s library and became the nidus of the National
Library of Medicine. The Welch Medical Library at the
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine adopted
this same system. Additionally, the Army ambulance
system was developed during the Civil War because
removing injured soldiers to field hospitals had a better
outcome than treating soldiers in the field. Further-
more, soldiers suffering war wounds frequently died
from infection. This lesson was not lost on military
physicians. As the end of the war neared, the fledgling
science of bacteriology and epidemiology became hot
topics of battlefield military medical research. Surgi-
cal techniques and use of anesthesia and antiseptics
became commonplace during the Civil War. 5-7
The Civil War was also a testing ground for medi-
cal education. One lesson learned from the war was
that many who served as military physicians did not
have the skills needed to save lives in the battlefield.
So the Army created its own medical school at what
later became the old Walter Reed Army Institute of
Research building. Those who created this school liked
the training being done at Johns Hopkins, where some
later became faculty. Later, civilian hospitals adopted
the same surgical techniques and treatment methods.
Johns Hopkins Medical School created new academic
standards not found at “proprietary” medical schools.
Thus, with the help and influence of military medical
experience, Johns Hopkins set the stage for medical
treatment in the modern era.
Surgeon General George Sternberg, who had been
trained as a bacteriologist at Johns Hopkins Medical
School, appointed Major Walter Reed, another Johns
Hopkins medical trainee, to the Yellow Fever Commis-
sion in 1900. Reed used “informed consent” statements
when he recruited volunteer subjects from among
soldiers and civilians during the occupation of Cuba at
the end of the Spanish-American War, and those state-
ments could be considered “personal service contracts”
(Figure 24-2). These documents clearly communicated
the risks and benefits of participation, described the
purpose of the study, provided a general timeline for
participation, and stated that compensation and medi-
cal care would be provided. All of these are standard
elements required in informed consent forms provided
to research participants today. Even if the yellow fever
statements did not directly influence the creation of
other military or civilian informed consent documents,
it is at least plausible to claim that documentation of
informed consent from research participants in the
military predates the practice in civilian medicine.
Biodefense, Ethics, and Research in the 20th Century
Ethical issues surrounding informed consent con-
tinued into the 20th century. At the same time, the
importance of strategic research was emphasized,
which influenced the growth of epidemiological and
infectious disease research. A 1925 Army regulation
(AR) promoting infectious disease research noted
that “volunteers” should be used in “experimental”
research. 8 In 1932 the secretary of the Navy granted
permission for experiments with divers, provided they
were “informed volunteers.” 9
The importance of strategic medical research was
not unwarranted. In 1939 Japanese scientists attempted
to obtain virulent strains of yellow fever virus from
Rockefeller University. The attempt was thwarted by
vigilant scientists, but it did not take long before the
threat of biological weaponry reached the War Depart-
ment. In 1941 Secretary of War Henry L Stimson wrote
to Frank B Jewett, president of the National Academy
of Sciences, and asked him to appoint a committee to
recommend actions. He wrote, “Because of the dan-
gers that might confront this country from potential
enemies employing what may be broadly described as
biological warfare, it seems advisable that investiga-
tions be initiated to survey the present situation and
the future possibilities.” 10 In the summer of 1942, the
War Research Service was established, under George
W Merck, Jr, in the civilian Federal Security Agency
to begin development of the US biological warfare
program with offensive and defensive objectives. On
October 9, 1942, the full committee of the War Research
Service endorsed the chairman’s statement on the use
of humans in research:
Human experimentation is not only desirable, but
necessary in the study of many of the problems of
war medicine which confront us. When any risks are
involved, volunteers only should be utilized as sub-
jects, and these only after the risks have been fully
explained and after signed statements have been
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Ethical and Legal Dilemmas in Biodefense Research
a
Fig. 24-2. ( a ) English translation of the yellow fever informed consent document. ( b ) Spanish version of the yellow fever
informed consent documents. Major Walter Reed, who was appointed to the Yellow Fever Commission in 1900, used “in-
formed consent” statements when he recruited volunteer subjects from among soldiers and civilians during the occupation
of Cuba at the end of the Spanish-American War, which could be considered “personal service contracts.” However, these
( Figure 24-2 continues )
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