memorabilia.pdf

The

Memorabilia

____________________

Xenophon

Translated By H.G. Dakyns

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BOOK I

I have often wondered by what arguments those who indicted[1]

Socrates could have persuaded the Athenians that his life was justly

forfeit to the state. The indictment was to this effect: "Socrates is

guilty of crime in refusing to recognize the gods acknowledged by

the state, and importing strange divinities of his own; he is further

guilty of corrupting the young."

[1] {oi grapsamenoi} = Meletus (below, IV. iv. 4, viii. 4; "Apol."

11, 19), Anytus ("Apol." 29), and Lycon. See Plat. "Apol." II. v.

18; Diog. Laert. II. v. (Socr.); M. Schanz, "Plat. Apol. mit

deutschen Kemmentar, Einleitung," S. 5 foll.

In the first place, what evidence did they produce that

Socrates refused to recognise the gods acknowledged by the state?

Was it that he did not sacrifice? or that he dispensed with

divination? On the contrary, he was often to be seen engaged in

sacrifice, at home or at the common altars of the state. Nor was his

dependence on divination less manifest. Indeed that saying of his,

"A divinity[2] gives me a sign," was on everybody's lips. So much

so that, if I am not mistaken, it lay at the root of the imputation that

he imported novel divinities; though there was no greater novelty in

his case than in that of other believers in oracular help, who

commonly rely on omens of all sorts: the flight or cry of birds, the

utterances of man, chance meetings,[3] or a victim's entrails. Even

according to the popular conception, it is not the mere fowl, it is not

the chance individual one meets, who knows what things are

profitable for a man, but it is the gods who vouchsafe by such

instruments to signify the same. This was also the tenet of Socrates.

Only, whereas men ordinarily speak of being turned aside, or urged

onwards by birds, or other creatures encountered on the path,

Socrates suited his language to his conviction. "The divinity," said

he, "gives me a sign." Further, he would constantly advise his

associates to do this, or beware of doing that, upon the authority of

this same divine voice; and, as a matter of fact, those who listened

to his warnings prospered, whilst he who turned a deaf ear to them

repented afterwards.[4] Yet, it will be readily conceded, he would

hardly desire to present himself to his everyday companions in the

character of either knave or fool. Whereas he would have appeared

to be both, supposing[5] the God-given revelations had but revealed

his own proneness to deception. It is plain he would not have

ventured on forecast at all, but for his belief that the words he spoke

would in fact be verified. Then on whom, or what, was the

assurance rooted, if not upon God? And if he had faith in the gods,

how could he fail to recognise them?

[2] Or, "A divine something." See "Encyc. Brit." "Socrates." Dr. H.

Jackason; "The Daemon of Socrates," F. W. H. Myers; K. Joel,

"Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates," i. p. 70 foll.; cf.

Aristot. "M. M." 1182 a 10.

[3] See Aesch. "P. V." 487, {enodious te sombolous}, "and

pathway tokens," L. Campbell; Arist. "Birds," 721, {sombolon

ornin}: "Frogs," 196, {to sometukhon exion}; "Eccl." 792; Hor.

"Od." iii. 27, 1-7.

[4] See "Anab." III. i. 4; "Symp." iv. 48.

[5] Or, "if his vaunted manifestations from heaven had but

manifested the falsity of his judgment."

But his mode of dealing with his intimates has another aspect.

As regards the ordinary necessities of life,[6] his advice was, "Act

as you believe[7] these things may best be done." But in the case

of those darker problems, the issues of which are incalculable,

he directed his friends to consult the oracle, whether the

business should be undertaken or not. "No one," he would say,

"who wishes to manage a house or city with success: no one

aspiring to guide the helm of state aright, can afford to dipense with

aid from above. Doubtless, skill in carpentering, building,

smithying, farming, of the art of governing men, together with the

theory of these processes, and the sciences of arithmetic, economy,

strategy, are affairs of study, and within the grasp of human

intelligence. Yet there is a side even of these, and that not the least

important, which the gods reserve to themselves, the bearing of

which is hidden from mortal vision. Thus, let a man sow a field or

plant a farm never so well, yet he cannot foretell who will gather in

the fruits: another may build him a house of fairest proportion, yet

he knows not who will inhabit it. Neither can a general foresee

whether it will profit him to conduct a campaign, nor a politician be

certain whether his leadership will turn to evil or good. Nor can the

man who weds a fair wife, looking forward to joy, know whether

through her he shall not reap sorrow. Neither can he who has built

up a powerful connection in the state know whether he shall not by

means of it be cast out of his city. To suppose that all these matters

lay within the scope of human judgment, to the exclusion of the

preternatural, was preternatural folly. Nor was it less extravagant to

go and consult the will of Heaven on any questions which it is

given to us to decide by dint of learning. As though a man should

inquire, "Am I to choose an expert driver as my coachman, or one

who has never handled the reins?" "Shall I appoint a mariner to

be skipper of my vessel, or a landsman?" And so with respect to all

we may know by numbering, weighing, and measuring. To seek

advice from Heaven on such points was a sort of profanity. "Our

duty is plain," he would observe; "where we are permitted to work

through our natural faculties, there let us by all means apply them.

But in things which are hidden, let us seek to gain knowledge from

above, by divination; for the gods," he added, "grant signs to those

to whom they will be gracious."

[6] Or, "in the sphere of the determined," {ta anagkaia} = certa,

quorum eventus est necessarius; "things positive, the law-ordained

department of life," as we might say. See Grote, "H. G." i. ch.

xvi. 500 and passim.

[7] Reading {os nomizoien}, or if {os enomizen}, translate "As to

things with certain results, he advised them to do them in the way

in which he believed they would be done best"; i.e. he did not

say, "follow your conscience," but, "this course seems best to me

under the circumstances."

Again, Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he

was to be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or

wrestling- grounds; at noon he would appear with the gathering

crowds in the market-place; and as day declined, wherever the

largest throng might be encountered, there was he to be found,

talking for the most part, while any one who chose might stop and

listen. Yet no one ever heard him say, or saw him do anything

impious or irreverent. Indeed, in contrast to others he set his face

against all discussion of such high matters as the nature of the

Universe; how the "kosmos," as the savants[8] phrase it, came into

being;[9] or by what forces the celestial phenomena arise. To

trouble one's brain about such matters was, he argued, to play the

fool. He would ask first: Did these investigators feel their

knowledge of things human so complete that they betook

themselves to these lofty speculations? Or did they maintain that

they were playing their proper parts in thus neglecting the affairs of

man to speculate on the concerns of God? He was astonished they

did not see how far these problems lay beyond mortal ken; since

even those who pride themselves most on their discussion of these

points differ from each other, as madmen do. For just as

some madmen, he said, have no apprehension of what is truly

terrible, others fear where no fear is; some are ready to say and do

anything in public without the slightest symptom of shame;[10]

others think they ought not so much as to set foot among their

fellow-men; some honour neither temple, nor altar, nor aught else

sacred to the name of God; others bow down to stocks and stones

and worship the very beasts:--so is it with those thinkers whose

minds are cumbered with cares[11] concerning the Universal

Nature. One sect[12] has discovered that Being is one and

indivisible. Another[13] that it is infinite in number. If one[14]

proclaims that all things are in a continual flux, another[15] replies

that nothing can possibly be moved at any time. The theory of the

universe as a process of birth and death is met by the counter

theory, that nothing ever could be born or ever will die.

[8] Lit. "the sophists." See H. Sidgwick, "J. of Philol." iv. 1872; v.

1874.

[9] Reading {ephu}. Cf. Lucian, "Icaromenip." xlvi. 4, in imitation

of this passage apparently; or if {ekhei}, translate "is arranged."

See Grote, "H. G." viii. 573.

[10] See "Anab." V. iv. 30.

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