parametry searchu.pdf
(
167 KB
)
Pobierz
912007 UNPDF
regressions show that employer size,
i.e.
the number of employees of the
rm or es-
of labor market
ows (Mortensen (1986), Blanchard and Diamond (1989)),
e.g.
i.e.
random from the point of view of the individual employer or employee. The
that are di
cult to test directly, as required by
e.g.
e
ciency wage models.
= rate at which jobs terminate
w
= wage rate
p
= marginal value product of employee
b
= value of leisure (which, among other things, depends on unemployment bene
ts
m
= number (measure) of workers
u
= number (measure) of the unemployed
F
(
w
) = distribution function of wage o
er distribution
G
(
w
) = distribution function of earnings distribution
r
= reservation wage of unemployed job seekers
The distribution functions
F
and
G
have the usual properties: they are right-
continuous. The left-hand limit of
F
at
w
is denoted by
F
(
w
). Initially,we allow
for discontinuities in
F
,
i.e.
there maybewages with
F
(
w
)
F
(
w
)
>
0. This is
i.e.
the unemployed and employed individuals, and of the employers. This behavior,
First, we consider the workers. The unemployed obtain wage o
ers from
F
(
w
)
at an exogenous rate
wealth of the unemployed. It is characterized by a reservation wage
r
(Mortensen
1
F
(
w
)
r
=
b
+(
0
1
)
d
w
+
1
(1
F
(
w
))
are equal. The unemployed may accept o
ers below
b
if
shows that wage o
ers are implicitly discounted at a rate
+
1
(1
F
(
w
)), which
gies. The
ow from unemployment to employmentis
0
(1
F
(
r
))
u
, the product
workers. The
ow from employment to unemploymentis
(
m
u
). In a steady state
u
=
+
(1
F
(
r
))
bution function
G
. The wages paid to a cross-section of employees are on average
jobs. Consider the stock of employees with a wage less or equal to
w
, which has mea-
sure
G
(
w
)(
m
u
). In the steady-state the
ows into and from this stock are equal,
equal to
w
, and this
ow is equal to
0
(
F
(
w
)
F
(
r
))
u
if
w
r
and is 0 otherwise.
The
ow out of this group consists of those who become unemployed,
G
(
w
)(
m
u
)
and those who receive a job o
er that exceeds
w
,
(1
F
(
w
))
G
(
w
)(
m
u
). In a
steady state the in
ow and out
ow are equal, and we can express
G
as a function
of
F
F
(
w
)
F
(
r
)
G
(
w
)=
1
F
(
r
)
+
1
(1
F
(
w
))
where wehave substituted for
u
from equation (2.2). This equation holds if
w
r
,
and
G
(
w
) = 0 otherwise. Note that if jobs last forever,
i.e.
= 0, the steady-state
all workers haveawage equal to
p
. In the sequel we only consider the case that
>
0.
that o
ers wage
w
. There are (
G
(
w
)
G
(
w
h
))(
m
u
) employees that earn a wage
in the interval (
w
h; w
] and there are
F
(
w
)
F
(
w
h
) employers that o
er a wage
Plik z chomika:
Nero
Inne pliki z tego folderu:
uwagi do estymacji searchu.pdf
(288 KB)
Search methods and transition rate-estymacje.pdf
(203 KB)
sargenttab.pdf
(29 KB)
sargent.pdf
(165 KB)
parametry searchu.pdf
(167 KB)
Inne foldery tego chomika:
Blanchard
Case'y
Commuting
EFZ
Instytucje
Zgłoś jeśli
naruszono regulamin