William M. Donnelly - Transforming an Army at War; Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005 (2007).pdf

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TransformInG
an armY aT War
Designing the modular force
1991–2005
by
William M. Donnelly
Center of Military History
United States Army
Washington, D.C., 2007
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Donnelly, William M., 1962–
Transforming an Army at war : designing the modular force,
1991–2005 / by William M. Donnelly.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
1. United States. Army—Reorganization—History—20th century.
2. United States. Army—Reorganization—History—21st century.
3. United States. Army—Organization. 4. Military planning—United
States. I. Title.
UA25.D66 2007
355.30973’09049—dc22
2007030193
CMH Pub 70–108–1
First Printing
foreword
By the summer of 2003, the intensive combat operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan were placing a great strain on the U.S. Army. General
Peter J. Schoomaker, sworn-in as the chief of staff of the Army on 1
August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of
an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how
the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of
converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This massive
effort would represent the most far-reaching transformation of the Army’s
operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the
Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s.
This study, prepared at the U.S. Army Center of Military History,
examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking
it, and the process of developing modular unit designs. The Army had
been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of
the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating
a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and
headquarters—that could be assembled into, or “plugged into” (and
unplugged from), larger formations as needed with minimal augmen-
tation or reorganization. A modular force, in theory, would greatly
enhance the ability of the Army to construct packages of units tailored
for speciic missions identiied by regional combatant commands. For
General Schoomaker, modularity also offered the opportunity to lessen
the strain that prosecuting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was placing
on the Army. Converting to a modular force could increase the number
of brigade combat teams in the Army without increasing the overall size
of the service, and more brigades would mean longer times between
overseas deployments. Scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, the 3d
Infantry Division would be the irst formation to change to a modular
coniguration.
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